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The Misappropriation Theory in Light of Carpenter
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988*
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is the financial touchstone of the late 1980's. It rep-
resents Wall Street's greed run rampant.' Insider trading epitomizes
"yuppie fever"-the creation of excessive wealth by young Wall
Street professionals. The extent and pervasiveness of insider trading
is self-evident; it has been an extensive subject of the popular press
and has even been the subject of a major motion picture.2 Yet, be-
hind the scenes, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Congress, and the courts are taking affirmative steps to stop the lat-
est form of insider trading-that undertaken by nontraditional insid-
ers or outsiders to the corporation. This comment addresses
measures designed to prevent illegal trading on material nonpublic
information by individuals who are not traditional insiders. 3
In November 1988, then President Reagan signed the Insider Trad-
ing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (the Act).4 The
* For WESTLAW(®) computerized research regarding legislative and regulatory
developments about insider trading liability, select the BNA-SRLR database and use
the following search query: insider /s trad! /p liab! & date (aft 1985). For daily news
reports concerning congressional reaction to the insider trading scandals, select the
VU/TEXT database, BG4 and use the following search query: insider /trading &
congress senate house. For SEC actions concerning insider trading violations since
1985, select the FSEC-DKT database and use the following search query: insider /s
trad! & date (aft 1985). WESTLAW(®) is a registered trademark of West Publishing
Company.
1. See Nathans & Smart, A Backlash Against Business?, BuS. WK., Feb. 6, 1989,
at 30.
2. Wall Street (20th Century Fox 1987).
3. Traditional insiders are directors, officers, or shareholders with at least a ten
percent ownership. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1982). These three groups are considered agents of the corporation and owe
it a fiduciary duty. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (rule 10b-5 applies to officers and directors who trade in their corporation's stock
while possessing material inside information).
4. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(signed by former President Reagan on November 19, 1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 910,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102
Stat.) 6043 [hereinafter REPORT].
Act expressly bodified the misappropriation theory as a means to es-
tablish liability under the insider trading laws. Under the misappro-
priation theory, liability arises when an individual trades on the basis
of information acquired in violation of a fiduciary duty of confidenti-
ality owed to another, whether it be a corporation, an employer, or
an individual.5 Part II of this comment will address the evolution of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Part III will detail the misappropriation
theory's development, the Second Circuit's application of the theory,
and the United States Supreme Court's position on the theory. For
the practitioner, Part IV delineates the parameters of the misappro-
priation theory and the theory's effect on a section 10(b) cause of ac-
tion. Part V will address the Act. Finally, Part VI will provide a
critique of the misappropriation theory and the Act.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 was designed
"to eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses which
were found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and
the depression of the 1930's." 7 The purpose of section 10(b) is to
maintain a fair and honest market by requiring full disclosure of in-
formation,8 thus protecting public investors.9 The Supreme Court
5. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Non-
public Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984). The author contends that the mis-
appropriation theory should support Rule 10b-5 violations when "[outsiders] trade on
the basis of nonpublic information that has been entrusted to them with the expecta-
tion that they will hold it in confidence and refrain from acting upon it ... Id. at
102.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) prohibits the use "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe..." Id.
7. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (footnote
omitted).
8. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)).
.9. Commentators have sharply criticized the SEC's position on the evils of insider
trading. See Note, The Ffficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1056-57 (1977). Market
efficiency results from two factors:
vigorous competitive securities analysis and trading by corporate insiders with
superior ability to forecast future performance by their firms. Each of these
processes may account in part for market efficiency, but in any case the SEC
should no longer ignore the overwhelming evidence of securities market effi-
ciency in formulating its regulatory policy.
Id.; see also Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV.
857, 861 (1983) (footnote omitted) (insider trading is "an efficient way to compensate
corporate managers"); M. Moran, Insider Trading In The Stock Market: An Empirical
Test Of The Damage to Outsiders (Center for the Study of American Business, Work-
ing Paper No. 89, Wash. U., July 1984) (unpublished manuscript). The empirical re-
sults suggest that "insider trading harms no one and improves the performance of the
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has noted that section 10(b), when implemented by rule 10b-5,1o is an
all-inclusive provision designed to prevent any fraudulent activity.1
Rule 10b-512 was similarly enacted to protect investors against
fraudulent practices. 13 During its development, litigation primarily
focused on corporate officers and directors who traded in their com-
pany's securities based upon undisclosed material information.14 Ul-
timately, the courts have been responsible for the development of
rule 10b-5.15 Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted that this rule has be-
come a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legisla-
tive acorn."16
The seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.17 established the dis-
stock market. Therefore, the insiders' profits are not outsiders' losses but evidence of
more efficient resource allocation." Id. at 1. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 25-35 (1988) (discussion concerning the philosophies behind
the development of the federal securities statutes).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). See infra note 12 for the text of this regulation.
11. Chiarella v. United. States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976)).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
13. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
see also Comment, A New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange-A Comment
on In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 15 S.C.L. REV. 557, 565 (1963) [hereinafter New Concept]
(noting that before In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), "the courts and
even the Commission unjustifiably restricted the application of Rule 10b-5 to include
only those insiders as defined by [section] 16b (officers, directors, and 10% controlling
shareholders)"); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1144-46 (1950) (details who insiders are, to
whom the duty to disclose is owed, and when the duty exists).
15. See generally L. Loss, supra note 9, at 726-29. As section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
are "virtually as vague as the Due Process Clause, the law is surely as much judge-
made as is the classic common law of the states." Id. at 728.
16. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
'17. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The SEC initiated administrative proceedings against
Cady, Roberts & Co., a brokerage firm and Mr. Gintel, a broker-dealer, for violations
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Mr. Cowdin, a registered representative of Cady, Rob-
erts & Co. and a director of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, notified Gintel of a dividend
reduction by Curtiss-Wright. Prior to public dissemination of this information, Gintel
sold 7,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock. Id. at 908-10.
close or abstain doctrine. The SEC held the brokerage firm of Cady,
Roberts & Co. and Mr. Gintel, a Cady, Robert's broker-dealer, in vio-
lation of rule 10b-5.18 The Commission held that a corporate insider
has a fiduciary duty to either abstain from trading in his corpora-
tion's securities or disclose all material information prior to any trad-
ing. 19 The SEC based the disclose or abstain doctrine on two
principles: (1) the existence of a relationship which provides access to
information intended only for a corporate purpose; and (2) the inher-
ent unfairness of using the information for personal advantage.20
The significance of Cady, Roberts stems from the analytical frame-
work provided in applying rule 10b-5 to individuals who do not fit
within the classification of traditional insiders.21
SEC v. Texas Guf Sulphur Co.22 was the first court of appeals case
to apply rule 10b-5 to nontraditional corporate insiders while address-
ing the duty to disclose material information under rule 10b-5.23 The
18. Id. at 913.
19. Id. at 911. Ultimately, because of the common law duty owed to the corpora-
tion, the directors' only viable option under the "disclose or abstain" rule is to abstain
from trading. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1934).
It might be that the director was in possession of information which his duty
to the company required him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not disclose
the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation to the company overrides
that to an individual holder of the stock.
Id.; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Any person possessing mate-
rial inside information "must either disclose it ... or, if disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence .... abstain from trading" in the securities. Id.
20. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
21. New Concept, supra note 14, at 565-70. "Thus in Cady, Roberts, the Commis-
sion finally has an opportunity to administer the spirit of the act, which is to expand
the concept of fraud so that the investing public may rely without detriment on the
honesty and integrity of the securities market and those who deal therein." Id. at 570.
See Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady,
Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121, 122 (1962). The Cady, Roberts decision estab-
lishes three principles: nondisclosure operates as fraud or deceit, rule 10b-5 reaches
noninsiders, and the duty to disclose is owed in the impersonal securities market. Id.
22. 401 F.2d at 833. The defendant company issued a press release in response to
rumors of a substantial mineral discovery. The press release stated that the rumors
regarding the extent of the discovery were unsubstantiated. Four days later, the com-
pany issued a second press release concerning the exact magnitude of the mineral
field. During the interim, a Texas Gulf Sulphur director, two officers, and several
other employees purchased shares in the company. Id. at 843-47.
23. See Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implica-
tions, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 732 (1968). Texas Gulf Sulphur additionally established three
tests to determine materiality of the nondisclosure or misrepresentation: "the reason-
able investor test," whether the information would affect a reasonable investor's in-
vestment decision; "the probability factor," materiality depends upon the balance of
the probability that the event will occur and the total effect the event would have on
the company; and the "cut-your-own-throat element," evidence of materiality exists
whenever an insider trades. Id. at 740-42; see also Farley, A Current Look at the Law
of Insider Trading, 39 Bus. LAW. 1771, 1773 (1984) (judicial focus changed from exam-
ining fiduciary duties to the concept of inherent unfairness when permitting informa-
tional advantages among market investors); Fleischer, Securities Trading and
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Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that certain officers, directors,
and geologist employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur possessed material
nonpublic information regarding exploratory drilling activities and,
although some of these individuals were not traditional corporate in-
siders, they were nevertheless under a duty to disclose the informa-
tion concerning the magnitude of the mineral discovery or to refrain
from trading.24 Their failure to abstain from trading in the stock
during the exploration period resulted in a rule 10b-5 violation.25
The court expanded the holding of Cady, Roberts by stating that
"[a]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or... [if unwilling to disclose or, if
due to a corporate confidence, is unable to disclose, to] ...abstain
from trading or in recommending the securities. ... 26
In Chiarella v. United States,2 7 the Supreme Court examined the
duty of an individual to disclose material nonpublic information in
light of rule 10b-5 when the individual was unconnected to the sub-
ject corporations. Chiarella failed to disclose information concerning
takeover target corporations acquired through his job. Instead, he
purchased each company's stock, which he sold as soon as the news
of the takeover had been publicly disseminated.28 He consequently
earned $30,000 over a fourteen month period.29 Although the Second
Circuit affirmed his conviction under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,30
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Chiarella's trading without
disclosure did not violate section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.31
Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceed-
ings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1965) (noting that Texas Gulf Sulphur is not a radical
departure from securities law; rather, it is a consistent development of the federal se-
curities law).
24. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 848.
25. Id
26. Id However, in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), the Second Circuit retreated from the disclose
or abstain rule in Texas Gulf Sulpher and stated, "[w]e know of no rule of law, applica-
ble at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary
relationship to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that
might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale." Id at 164.
27. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella was employed by a financial printing firm. His
capacity as a markup man included handling five separate documents concerning cor-
porate takeovers. Although the name of the takeover targets were concealed,
Chiarella could ascertain the target companies through other information that was
provided in the document. Id at 224.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id at 225.
31. Id. at 237.
Chiarella is significant because of the limitation placed on rule 10b-
5.32 The Court noted that past rule 10b-5 violations involved individ-
uals who owed a preexisting duty of care to the party trading on the
information.33 Chiarella was not a corporate insider, and therefore
owed no preexisting duty to disclose the information he acquired to
the opposite party to the transaction.34 Thus, a duty to disclose infor-
mation exists only when the party trading on the information has a
preexisting duty or relationship of trust and confidence.3 5 The
Court's opinion displays a strict statutory construction, and a narrow
interpretation of section 10(b)'s reach.3 6
In Dirks v. SEC,37 Dirks, as an officer of a brokerage house, re-
ceived information from a former officer of Equity Funding of
America (Equity Funding) that Equity Funding's assets were vastly
overstated. While investigating, Dirks discussed the alleged fraud
with individuals who subsequently sold their Equity Funding hold-
ings. The SEC found Dirks liable for violating the anti-fraud provi-
sions of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.38 The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia entered judgment against Dirks, basing
its decision on the SEC's opinion.39 However, the Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that Dirks had no duty to abstain from using the ma-
32. Note, Rule 10b-5 and Non-Traditional Insiders: The Supreme Court Continues
Its Retrenchment Trend, Chiarella v. United States, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 181, 200-201
(1980). By narrowly interpretating rule 10b-5, the Court created a gap that allows a
nontraditional insider to trade on material inside information without the threat of
prosecution. See Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It
Takes a Thief, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 112-15 (1980). The Chiarella opinion is flawed
because it restricted the liability of potential defendants through its requirement of a
duty of trust and confidence between the buyer and seller, and it decreased the SEC's
power to control insider trading by declining to rule on the misappropriation theory as
an alternative theory of liability. Id.
33. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229-30; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) (bank officers were charged with responsibility to their
shareholders and could not act as market makers and induce individuals to sell with-
out first disclosing the existence of second market); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dy-
namics Funds, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (held "[t]he party charged with
failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose it to the plain-
tiffs"); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1168-70 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure of
brokerage firm to disclose to its clients that the brokerage firm was making a market
in the stock was a failure to disclose a material fact under, inter alia, rule lOb-5); Gen-
eral Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1026 (1969) (purchaser has no obligation to reveal material facts to potential seller, un-
less he is either an insider or a fiduciary).
34. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33. To hold otherwise, the Court would be forced to
recognize a broad duty among all market participants, and this would be contrary to
the doctrine requiring a specific relationship between the parties. Id. at 233.
35. Id. at 228.
36. Id. at 233-34. But see 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7.5(511), at 7.233 (1979). A majority of the justices of the
Chiarella Court accepted some version of the misappropriation theory. Id.
37. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id.
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terial nonpublic information.40
Dirks is significant for establishing the tipper/tippee liability stan-
dard4l and the Court's emphasis on market efficiency as a function of
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.42 The Court reiter-
ated that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading is dependent upon
a relationship of trust and confidence vis-i-vis a corporation's share-
holders.43 This duty is predicated upon a preexisting fiduciary rela-
tionship.44 Although Dirks received his information from a corporate
insider, the Court held that a tippee45 must refrain from trading only
when an insider has breached his fiduciary duty.46 A breach occurs
when the insider/tipper discloses material nonpublic information to
the outsider/tippee.47 "[T]he test is whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some
personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. Ab-
sent a breach by the insider, there has been no derivative breach."48
Dirks' tipper did not benefit from his disclosure.4 9 Thus, there was
no breach by the insider and Dirks could not have committed a deriv-
ative breach.5 0
40. Id. at 667.
41. See generally Note, Dirks v. SEC: Delineating the Scope of Insider Trading Li-
ability Under Rule 10b-5, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 329 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Delineat-
ing]; Note, Dirks v. SEC: Tippee Liability After Chiarella v. United States, 59 TuL. L.
REV. 502 (1984).
42. Note, The Supreme Court's Highwire Act: Balancing SEC Enforcement and
Market Efftciency in Dirks v. SEC, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 923, 944-47 (1984).
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
44. Id. at 654-55; see also Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d
490 (7th Cir. 1986). The duty of disclosure must exist from a fiduciary relationship
which is not established by the securities laws. Id. at 495-96.
45. "[Tlhose who receive material nonpublic information from insiders...." Note,
Delineating, supra note 41, at 330.
46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 662; see SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). In Switzer, a
director of Phoenix Resources informed his wife at a track meet of the possibility of
liquidating Phoenix (which the court considered material information), so that the
wife would know his business schedule, and thus enable her to make child care ar-
rangements. Defendants overheard this information. The court held that the director
did not breach a fiduciary duty to shareholders of Phoenix because disclosure was not
for an "improper purpose," which is either a direct or indirect benefit to the insider,
and thus the first prong of Dirks was not established. Id. at 766. The second prong of
Dirks was not satisfied either, as the SEC failed to establish that the defendants knew
the information was material, nonpublic, and disseminated by insiders for an improper
purpose. Id.
49. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67.
50. Id. at 667. But see 5A A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 10B-
5 § 66.02[a][iii][C], at 3-494.9 (2d ed. 1989 revision). Six justices of the majority ap-
III. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. The Development of the Misappropriation Theory
As an alternative avenue to establishing liability, then Chief Jus-
tice Burger first raised the misappropriation theory in his dissenting
opinion in Chiarella.51 Under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty
to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."52 As a gen-
eral rule, there is no duty to make disclosure to the opposing party in
an arms-length business transaction. However, Chief Justice Burger
contended "the rule should give way when an informational advan-
tage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry,
but by some unlawful means." 53 Thus, the failure to disclose the mis-
appropriated information constitutes the necessary fraud element for
a rule 10b-5 action. Although criticized,5 4 Chief Justice Burger's dis-
senting opinion stimulated the development of the misappropriation
theory.
Commentators have suggested that, by building upon the dissent-
ing opinion in Chiarella55 and the dictum in Dirks, implicit accept-
ance of the misappropriation theory is possible.56 The Court stated
that Dirks did not "misappropriate or illegally obtain the information
."57 This statement is unnecessary to the holding in Dirks.58
Nonetheless, it indicates the Court would have reached a different
proved the misappropriation theory as evidenced by Justice Powell's dictum that Dirks
did not misappropriate the information about Equity Funding. Id.
51. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-45 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
see 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, § 66.02[a][iii][C][II], at 3-494.7 to .8. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion is unclear as to what specific activity violated rule 10b-5. Perhaps it was:
(a) the acquiring of the information through illegal avenues; (b) the use of the infor-
mation; or (c) the acquisition of the information, without consent of the entity which
created the information, and the subsequent use of the information for personal bene-
fit. Jacobs opts for the latter activity because it fits within rule 10b-5, and satisfies
Chief Justice Burger's language. Id
52. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Aldave, supra note 5, at 114-17. Former Chief Justice Burger's interpretation
of the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with the majority opinions in Chiarella
and Dirks. Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit rejected former Chief Jus-
tice Burger's view that the misappropriator of nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose or abstain from trading. Id. See generally Note, The SEC's Regulation
of the Financial Press: The Legal Implications of the Misappropriation Theory, 52
BROOKLYN L. REV. 43, 63-74 (1986) (general criticisms of the misappropriation theory).
However, "[t]he continued application of the theory may deter outsiders from using
material nonpublic information, and the image of a more rigorous enforcement pro-
gram may assuage the fears of the investing public .... " Id at 73-74 (citation omitted).
55. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 95.
57. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
58. According to Donald Schwartz, professor at Georgetown University Law
Center, the "most important thing" about Dirks "was the survival of the misappropria-
tion theory of inside trading-'a Phoenix rising out of the ashes of C0iarella.'" Special
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result had Dirks misappropriated the information, thus implicitly ac-
cepting the misappropriation theory.59 However, in light of subse-
quent cases and the enactment of the Act, the debate over the
validity of this argument is purely academic.
B. The Second Circuit's Application of the Misappropriation
Theory
The Second Circuit 6o addressed the misappropriation theory for
the first time in United States v. Newman.61 The court reasoned that
the misappropriation of confidential information concerning merger
and acquisition proposals by a securities trader constituted sufficient
fraud upon the defendants' employers.62 The Second Circuit rejected
the district court's statement that the defendants' fraud must be ex-
acted upon the purchasers or sellers of the security.63 Rather, the
purchase or sale requirement had been satisfied as the defendants'
"sole purpose in participating in the misappropriation of confidential
takeover information was to purchase shares in the target companies
.... "64 Thus, the alleged fraudulent acts constituted a rule 10b-5
Report: Hostile Takeout Theme Pervades Fifth Garrett Securities Conference, 17 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 899 (May 17, 1985).
59. Note, supra note 42, at 937.
60. Due to the geographic location of the stock exchanges within the Second Cir-
cuit, this Court of Appeals has had extensive experience with federal securities regula-
tion cases. Consequently, other circuits look to the Second Circuit for guidance
concerning securities-related issues. Bromberg, supra note 23, at 732.
61. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Newman, a securi-
ties trader, received confidential material information from employees of Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc. and Kuhn Loeb & Co., both investment banking firms. The infor-
mation concerned merger and acquisition proposals entrusted to Morgan Stanley and
Kuhn Loeb. Newman then passed the information along to two foreign investors, and
all three purchased stock in the companies involved. The district court dismissed the
indictment, but the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id.; see O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179
(D.N.Y. 1981). The O'Connor court noted that even though insiders of Amax, Inc. and
Standard Oil of California, Inc. and their tippees owed no duty to the writers of call
options, "under the Newman rationale, because their trading or tipping breached fidu-
ciary duties owed to other parties [their respective corporations], the alleged conduct
constituted a fraudulent practice within the meaning of the securities laws." Id. at
1185; see also M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§ 3.04, at 3-16.2 (1988). O'Connor "can be read more narrowly as applying only to the
duties of insiders and their tippees when trading on information derived from the is-
suer." Id. A broader reading would contradict the Chiarella holding that a duty to dis-
close results from a relationship between the parties to the transaction. Id. at 3-16.2 to
.3.
64. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18; see Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 552 F.
violation.65
In SEC v. Materia,66 the Second Circuit faced facts virtually identi-
cal to those in Chiarella. Materia misappropriated information from
the financial printing firm where he was employed. Prior to public
disclosure, he traded on the illicitly acquired information for his fi-
nancial benefit. The court relied upon Newman, holding that misap-
propriation came within the anti-fraud section of the securities law
and, therefore, Materia's subsequent trading violated section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.67 The misappropriation of the employer's property
constituted sufficient fraud "upon any person."68 Furthermore, be-
cause the misappropriation was part of the plan to trade on the infor-
mation, the fraud was committed "in connection with" the purchase
and sale of securities as required by rule 10b-5.69
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. ,70 the Second Circuit addressed for
Supp. 439 (D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984). The Chemical Bank court
stated:
Superintendent of Insurance and its progeny require a nexus, albeit not a di-
rect or close relationship, between the allegedly fraudulent conduct and the
sale of the securities. Stated otherwise, the fraudulent conduct must 'touch
upon' the securities transaction. This has been called the 'de minimis touch
test,' primarily because it does not take much of a 'touch' to satisfy the test.
Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted); see also 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note
36, § 4.7(574), at 88.32 to .37 (judicial interpretations of "connection" have been very
expansive).
65. Newman, 664 F.2d at 19; see Note, Rule 10b-5 Developments-Theories of Lia-
bility, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 984 (1982).
The effect of Newman is to shift the focus for establishing liability under rule
10b-5 from a duty to the other party to a securities transaction to a duty to the
source of nonpublic information. To trade on confidential information is to
defraud the source of that information. After Newman, mere possession of
confidential information can impose a duty to abstain from trading.
Id. (footnote omitted).
66. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
67. Id. at 201.
68. Id. at 201-03; see United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (D.N.Y. 1985).
"Once again, the facts [in Material included some harm to a third party, but the lan-
guage ... [in Material in no way implies that the misappropriation theory requires
anyone outside the employer/employee relationship to have been affected." Id. at 840-
41. To require otherwise would result in a "view that a securities fraud can only be
perpetrated against a buyer or seller of securities, a view clearly rejected in Newman."
Id. at 841.
69. Materia, 745 F.2d at 203; see SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (D.N.Y. 1986).
Tome exploited a confidential relationship with the Chief Executive Officer of Joseph
E. Seagram & Co. to obtain nonpublic information. The "in connection with" require-
ment was easily satisfied as "[t]he sole purpose of Tome's theft of confidential informa-
tion regarding Seagram's tender offer plans 'was to reap instant no-risk profits in the
stock market.'" Id. at 622 (quoting Materia, 745 F.2d at 203).
70. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). Warner-Lambert
Co. retained Morgan Stanley to evaluate the acquisition of Deseret Pharmaceutical
Company. Courtois, an employee of Morgan Stanley, informed Antoniu, an employee
of Kuhn Loeb & Co., of the proposed acquisitions. Antoniu subsequently informed
Newman. Based upon the confidential information concerning the potential takeover
of Deseret by Warner-Lambert, all three agreed to purchase Deseret stock. Plaintiff
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the first time whether an individual may rely on the misappropria-
tion theory when bringing a private cause of action. Moss brought
suit to recover damages for alleged violations of, inter alia, section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 after the defendants had purchased stock with
knowledge of an upcoming tender offer that should have been dis-
closed to the tender offeree's shareholders.71 The court rejected the
use of the misappropriation theory in a private cause of action as be-
ing contrary to the holdings in Chiiarella and DirkS72 because the
"defendants owed no duty of disclosure to plaintiff Moss, they com-
mitted no 'fraud' in purchasing shares of Deseret stock." 73 This hold-
ing affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing the complaint for
failure to state a valid section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 cause of action. 74
Commentators have argued, however, that the Moss court did not bar
the use of the misappropriation theory in a private cause of action,
but rather held only that the defendants owed no fiduciary duty to
the sellers of the target company's stock.75
The Second Circuit last addressed the misappropriation theory in
United States v. Carpenter.76 Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal (the Journal), wrote for the Journal's "Heard on the
Street" column.77 The column did not contain any corporate inside
Moss sold his stock in Deseret the same day the defendants purchased their stock.
When the information became public, Deseret stock appreciated by over 30%. Id. at 8.
71. Plaintiffs also sought treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), alleging
damage by an unlawful enterprise conducting a pattern of racketeering activity
through securities fraud. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding
that the plaintiff failed to state a valid cause of action under RICO. Moss, 719 F.2d at
8. For a discussion of the elements in a RICO cause of action, see R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1493-1508 (6th ed. 1987). For
a discussion of "pattern of racketeering activity," see Black, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO)-Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering
Crime After Sedima. What Is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REV.
365 (1986). See generally Note, A Day of Reckoning Is Near: RICO, Treble Damages,
and Securities Fraud, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (1984).
72. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16. But see infra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
73. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
74. Id.
75. Note, Insider Trading and the Corporate Acquirer: Private Actions Under
Rule 10b-5 Against Agents Who Trade on Misappropriated Information, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 600, 618 (1988).
76. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), off'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
77. The "Heard on the Street" column discusses selected stocks and analyzes mar-
ket movements. The column provides both positive and negative information concern-
ing the stocks featured in the column and expresses "a point of view with respect to
investment in the stocks that it reviews." United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827,
830 (D.N.Y. 1985).
information, but the articles did impact the stock prices of corpora-
tions featured in the column.78 Carpenter was a news clerk at the
Journal. Both Winans and Carpenter knew of the Journal's policy
that all news information was the Journal's property and that em-
ployees must treat it as confidential. 79 Carpenter, acting as Winans'
messenger, provided Felis, a stockbroker at Kidder Peabody, with in-
formation to be used in future "Heard on the Street" columns. The
three traded approximately twenty-seven times based on the infor-
mation Winans supplied, earning net profits of $690,000.80
The issue before the Second Circuit was whether the employee's
misappropriation of the employer's material nonpublic information
was a violation of the federal securities law.S1 In affirming the de-
fendants' criminal conviction,8 2 the Second Circuit rejected the de-
fendants' reliance upon Newman and Materia, reasoning that the
purpose of the misappropriation theory was to prohibit the conver-
sion of confidential information.83 Therefore, the fact that an indi-
vidual was not a corporate insider, and would not otherwise owe a
duty to the corporation, was irrelevant.8 4 The court held that Wi-
nans, as a Journal employee, had breached a duty of confidentiality
by misappropriating the Journal's publication schedule.85 An indi-
vidual cannot personally benefit from utilizing misappropriated infor-
78. See Study Says Impact of Journal Column Fell After Scandal, Wall St. J., Nov.
30, 1988, at C-26, col. 4 [hereinafter Study].
A new academic study concludes that the impact on stock prices of the Wall
Street Journal's Heard on the Street column declined after the disclosure in
1984 that one of the column's writers had taken part in an insider-trading
scheme, The study concludes that this reduced impact indicates that the col-
un's credibility was hurt by that scandal.
Id.
79. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
80. Id. at 1027.
81. Id. at 1027-28. But see Note, Financial Reporters, The Securities Laws and the
First Amendment: Where to Draw the Line, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1035, 1046 (1985).
Without an existing fiduciary duty between the newspaper and the corporation being
reported on, an essential element of the misappropriation theory is lacking. Thus, re-
porters escape liability under the misappropriation theory. Id. However, Carpenter fo-
cused on the duty owed between the reporter and the newspaper, as opposed to a
general duty owed between the reporter and his or her readers. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
82. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. But see Comment, United States v. Carpenter:
Second Circuit Overextends the Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 605, 606 (1987) (Carpenter decision is incorrect in al-
lowing criminal liability under the misappropriation theory to be dependent upon the
employer's policy concerning information the employee acquires within his
employment).
83. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29. The defendants contended that the misappro-
priation theory applies only when the employee has breached a duty owed to the em-
ployer and to the corporation whose securities were involved. See also Note, supra
note 81, at 1046.
84. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029.
85. Id. at 1028.
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mation acquired in breach of an employee's fiduciary duty of
confidentiality.86 Misappropriation of the Journal's information was
sufficient to establish fraud under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.87
Furthermore, a sufficient nexus existed between the duty and the
fraudulent scheme. The publication schedule was worthless except
"in connection with" the trading of the securities.88
The dissent contended that the misappropriation theory did not en-
compass the defendants' actions.8 9 The Journal's publication sched-
ule was not securities-related information. 90 Further, the potential
damage to the Journal's reputation 91 was not sufficiently harmful to
the securities markets or investors, and therefore was not within the
redress of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.92
C. The Supreme Court's Application of the Misappropriation
Theory
Although the misappropriation theory was presented in Chiarella,
the majority refused to address the issue because it was improperly
submitted to the jury.93 Nevertheless, four of the Chiarella justices
endorsed some form of the misappropriation theory.9 4 Moreover,
commentators have argued that the Dirks court implicitly accepted
the misappropriation theory.95 However, prior to Carpenter, the
Court had not directly addressed the misappropriation theory. Thus,
while these commentators asserted that the Court had already
adopted the misappropriation theory,96 it was desired that the Court
would directly rule on the merits of the theory when it granted certi-
86. Id. at 1031.
87. Id. at 1032.
88. Id. at 1033.
89. Id. at 1036 (Miner, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1036-37 (Miner, J., dissenting).
91. See generally Study, supra note 78, at C-26, col. 4.
92. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1037 (Miner, J., dissenting).
93. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980).
94. 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, § 66.02[a][iii][B], at 3-484.
95. Note, The Supreme Court's Highwire Act: Balancing SEC Enforcement and
Market Efficiency in Dirks v. SEC, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 923, 937 (1984) (Dirks majority
accepted the misappropriation theory by stating Dirks did not misappropriate the in-
formation, thus inferring that a different result might have occurred had Dirks misap-
propriated the information); accord 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, § 66.021a][iii][C], at 3-
494.9. According to Jacobs, in light of Dirks and Bateman, Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985), which reiterated that Dirks did not misappro-
priate the information, the Supreme Court has accepted the misappropriation theory.
5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, § 66.02[a][iii][c], at 3-494.9.
96. See supra note 95.
orari in Carpenter v. United States.97
Although the Carpenter Court unanimously affirmed the convic-
tions on the basis of the mail and wire fraud statutes, 98 it failed to
address the merits of the misappropriation theory and the section
10(b) violations.99 The Court stated only that it "is evenly divided
with respect to the convictions under the securities law and for that
reason affirms the judgment below on those counts."1°  Conse-
quently, the question remains whether the four unnamed dissenters
who favored the reversal of the securities law convictions disap-
proved the misappropriation theory or, rather, the application of the
theory to the particular facts in Carpenter.lOl
IV. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AND A SECTION 10(B)
CAUSE OF ACTION
In light of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act's adoption of the misappropriation theory as an avenue to estab-
lish a private cause of action for a section 10(b) violation,102 this sec-
97. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
98. Id. at 24. "We have little trouble in holding that the conspiracy here to trade
on the Journal's confidential information is not outside the reach of the mail and wire
fraud statutes.... The Journal's business information that it intended to be kept confi-
deiitial [the publication schedule and the content of the "Heard on the Street" column]
was its property .... Id. at 28. The requirement that the mail and wire medium be
used to execute the scheme was satisfied because, had the Journal not been distributed
to the public, there would be no possibility to profit from the misappropriated informa-
tion. Id.; see also Sontag, Misappropriation Theory in Limbo, an SEC Victory--or
Not?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 3, col. 2.
Even without affirming the securities theory, the justices' decision to broaden
the scope of mall and wire fraud statutes left the prosecutors' officers in good
shape. They could use those laws to prosecute insider traders even if the high
court overturns the misappropriation theory .... But the high court's broad
reading of the fraud statutes does not help the SEC, which can only press civil
cases; mall and wire fraud is a criminal offense.
Id.
99. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24; see Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpen-
ter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 375 (1988).
100. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
101. See Aldave, supra note 99, at 375-78 (discussion of the Carpenter deadlock);
Sontag, supra note 98, at 10, col. 1.
102. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102. Stat. 4677, 4680 (1988) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t-1).
Any person who violates any provision of this title.., by purchasing or selling
a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information shall be lia-
ble in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who, con-
temporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of
such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of secur-
ities) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securi-
ties of the same class.
Id.
For a discussion 'of an option trading private cause of action under rule 10b-5, see
Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1988) (asserting that a private cause of action exists under The
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tion will examine the parameters of the misappropriation theory and
its application to a section 10(b) private cause of action.
A. The Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory is rapidly becoming the most utilized
means of establishing liability under rule 10b-5.103 This theory incor-
porates the concept of an agent's fiduciary duty of confidentiality 0 4
with federal securities regulations. Generally stated, liability exists
when an individual acquires nonpublic material information in viola-
tion of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust or confidence, and then
trades based upon that information.105 The illegal acquisition of the
information may be viewed as fraud upon the person who controls
the information or as fraud upon the market participants in the se-
curities.' 06 Fraud does not exist simply from trading on an informa-
tional advantage. Rather, the trading becomes fraudulent when the
individual obtains the informational advantage by violating a fiduci-
ary, contractual, or similar duty owed to the rightful controller of the
information. 0 7
The misappropriation theory is utilized only when a duty exists be-
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, and that the restrictive interpretation of this
Act by the following Harvard Law Review note was incorrect); Note, Private Causes of
Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5." A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic
Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1959 (1987) (implied rights of action for option investors,
the duty requirement and the causation element; supports granting private rights of
action under rule lOb-5); Note, Securities Regulation for a Changing Market: Option
Trader Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 97 YALE L.J. 623 (1988) (noting that if the courts
improve their understanding of derivative securities, the federal statutes can ade-
quately deal with the relationships created by derivative securities). For a discussion
of commodities trading based upon nonpublic information, see Note, Trading in Com-
modity Futures Using Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 127 (1984).
103. Hagen, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: The Theoretical Bases for Liability,
44 Bus. LAW. 13, 23 (1988); see also Misappropriation Theory Adopted, Legal Times,
Oct. 1984, at 4, col. 3 (according to Daniel L. Goelzer, SEC's General Counsel, one-half
of the SEC's insider trading suits are based on the misappropriation theory).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) states:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to
use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal
or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in vio-
lation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the princi-
pal, on his own account or on behalf of another, although such information
does not relate to the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the
information is a matter of general knowledge.
Id.
105. Aldave, supra note 5, at 114.
106. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 36, § 7.5(510), at 7.232.
107. Aldave, supra note 5, at 121.
tween individuals. This duty may result from a fiduciary relation-
ship, a contractual relationship, or a similar obligation between the
misappropriator and the controller of the information. 08 It must be
established that the trading is based on the confidential information
that was acquired by breaching the fiduciary duty or obligation.
However, the person to whom the duty is owed and breached need
not be a purchaser or seller of the securities.' 09 Under the misappro-
priation theory, liability does not depend upon a breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to a corporation, or its shareholders, in whose stock the
misappropriator trades.110 Instead, liability turns on the misappropri-
ation and the subsequent trading as a violation of a fiduciary duty or
relationship between the misappropriator and the rightful controller
of the information."' In sum, the misappropriation theory forbids
individuals trading on information acquired in violation of a fiduciary
duty that is owed to the information controller.
Liability under the misappropriation theory extends beyond tradi-
tional insidersi i 2 to include other individuals as well. These "outsid-
ers" acquire material confidential information in violation of a duty
owed to an individual or a corporation controlling the information.
Under the traditional requirement, the misappropriator would have
to violate a duty directly owed to the shareholders of the corporation
in which the misappropriator trades. The misappropriation theory
establishes the requisite fiduciary relationship as also being between
an outsider and another entity, typically the outsider's employer to
whom the misappropriator owes a fiduciary duty." 3
Under an alternative analysis of the misappropriation theory," 4
the relevant issues are whether the defendant created the informa-
108. Id. at 122.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
110. Note, supra note 54, at 54-55. The following hypothetical is offered to illus-
trate that the fiduciary duty established under the misappropriation theory differs
from the duty established under Cady, Roberts. Employee steals confidential informa-
tion from Employer. This information was entrusted to the Employer by Corporation
for whom the Employer works or represents. If Employee was a traditional insider, he
would have breached a duty to Corporation and, according to Cady, Roberts, Employee
would have to either disclose the information to the public, or abstain from trading
while the information remained nonpublic. Yet, using the misappropriation theory,
Employee owes no duty to Corporation. She owes a duty only to Employer. Employee,
consequently, has no duty nor right to disclose the confidential information she has
stolen. She must, however, abstain from trading until Corporation publicly discloses
the information. Employee is an outsider with no duty or relationship to Corporation
and, therefore, cannot speak on behalf of Corporation. The first duty of disclosure
under Cady, Roberts does not exist, and Employee must therefore abstain from trading
until the information becomes public. Id. at 55-56.
111. Id. at 55.
112. For the definition of "traditional insiders," see supra note 3.
113. See Note, supra note 54, at 55-56.
114. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, at 3-494.8.
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tion and whether the creator of the information intended the infor-
mation to be used by the defendant for trading or tipping.115
Liability exists only if both issues are answered in the negative.
Under this analysis, the defendant escapes liability if the defendant
either created the information or if the information's creator in-
tended the information to be the basis of the defendant's trading.116
If the defendant did create the information, the misappropriation
theory does not prohibit the defendant from trading on the informa-
tion.117 Naturally, in this situation, there is no one from whom the
information could be misappropriated. This element protects market
analysts, specialists, arbitrageurs, investment advisors, and others
who properly discover and analyze corporate information. It permits
an individual "to capitalize on his experience and skill in securing
and evaluating relevant information; it provides incentive for hard
work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting." 118
In deciding whether the information was intended as a basis for
the defendant's trading or tipping, the intention of the information's
creator is determinative.11 9 First, the creator of the information
must be identified. 2 0 For example, a corporation, as an entity, cre-
ates information when it proposes a takeover. While the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO), as the corporation's agent, may ultimately decide
that the corporation should pursue the takeover, the CEO is acting
only on the corporation's behalf and is therefore not the creator of
the information. 12 1 The misappropriation theory applies to employ-
ees of an information source, usually high level officers or directors,
who receive information during the course of their employment. As
individuals, these employees did not create the information, and they
may not personally trade on it.122
If the information creator consents to insider trading, no liability
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3-494.11 to .12.
117. Id. at 3-494.10.
118. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger C.J., dissenting);
see also The 2 A.M. Wall Street Raid, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at A-26, col. 1.
119. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 26 n.36 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 925 (1972). Conflict of interest regulations may be analogized to rule 10b-5
mismanagement cases, in which a director has an interest which either "was of suffi-
cient importance to influence his action as a director," or "conflict[ed] with [his] status
as a shareholder[ ] or director[ ]." Id. See generally 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 50,
§ 118.01, at 5.90 to .105.
120. 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50, at 3-494.10.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3-494.11.
exists under the misappropriation theory 23 because, with consent, no
breach of a fiduciary duty can exist.' 24 Under the misappropriation
theory, a defendant has no duty to other market participants result-
ing from his duty owed to the information creator,125 and is therefore
free to trade on the information after receiving consent. However, if
the information source consents through its officers, and the individ-
ual receiving the consent is closely connected to the information
source, perhaps as an officer or director, this consent would be sub-
ject to conflict of interest concerns. 126
The following hypothetical is offered to assist in understanding this
interpretation of the misappropriation theory.127 Corporation A is
preparing for a tender offer of Target Corporation B. Thus, Corpora-
tion A, as the offerer in proposing a takeover, creates the informa-
tion. Pursuant to its tender offer, Corporation A purchases stock in
Target Corporation B prior to publicly disclosing the tender offer.
Thereafter, Corporation A informs its corporate allies of the takeover
prior to public announcement. The purpose in disclosing the infor-
mation is that its allies would purchase stock in Target Corporation
B and, eventually, tender it or provide support to Corporation A in
its acquisition of Target Corporation B.
Neither Corporation A, nor its allies, have violated the misappro-
priation theory. Corporation A has not violated the misappropriation
theory because it is the creator of the information. The allies also
have not violated the misappropriation theory because Corporation A
provided the information and intended the information to be a basis
for the allies' trading. Although the allies of Corporation A did not
create the information, liability still would exist if the allies lacked
consent from the information source to trade on the information.
Nevertheless, in this hypothetical, Corporation A, as the information
creator, provided the information and intended the allies to use it
when trading. Consequently, there is no liability, even though the al-
lies did not create the information, because the allies received con-
sent from the information source to trade on the information.
As an alternative example, liability also would exist when applying
the facts of Chiarella to this two-step test. First, Chiarella, as the
printing firm's employee, did not create the information concerning
the corporate takeovers.128 Instead, the information was created by
123. Id. at 3-494.13.
124. Id. at 3-494.12.
125. Id. at 3-494.13.
126. Id. For example, an inherent conflict of interest exists where the CEO of a
corporation authorizes his own use of material nonpublic information in his role as
corporate decision maker.
127. Id. at 3-494.12. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234
(1980) (discussing the "warehousing" of stocks).
128. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. As an employee of a financial printer, Chiarella did
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the corporations which proposed the tender offers. Second, none of
the involved corporations consented to Chiarella's use of the informa-
tion.12 9 Under the facts of Chiarella, both elements of the two-part
test would be answered negatively, resulting in liability against the
financial printing firm's employee.
B. Elements For a Section 10(b) Private Right of Action
An expressed private right of action now exists under the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.130 To bring
an action against an individual trading on inside information, the
plaintiff must have "contemporaneously" traded in the same class of
the security as the insider, albeit on the opposite side of the market
from the insider.I13 To establish a section 10(b) cause of action, 132 six
general elements are required. There must be a misrepresentation,
omission, or fraudulent device133 which is "in connection with"'134 a
purchase or sale of securities. 135 The defendant must have acted with
scienter or intent to defraud.136 The misrepresentation must also be
not create any of the information concerning the corporate takeovers because he
merely prepared the information for printing. Id.
129. Id. at 224-25. The corporations, by concealing the identities of the companies
involved in the takeover bids, implicitly did not provide Chiarella the necessary con-
sent to trade on the information. Id.
130. See supra note 102.
131. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. See generally 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 50,
§ 66.02[a][iii][D], at 3-494.16 to .19.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id-
133. See generally Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (instances of
corporate mismanagement held not to be a fraudulent device).
134. For impact of the Act on this element, see supra note 132 and infra notes 209-
15.
135. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A
section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 private cause of action is limited to actual purchasers or sell-
ers of securities. Id. at 731-55.
136. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Ernst, the Supreme
Court defined scienter as the "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193.
Recent cases have incorporated a defendant's knowledge of his duty of confidentiality
in determining whether there was a sufficient level of scienter. See SEC v. Musella,
material.137 In addition, the plaintiff must have justifiably relied13s
on the misrepresentation or omission and suffered damages as a
result.139
This comment will focus only on the effect of the misappropriation
theory on the misrepresentation, omission, or fraudulent device ele-
ment of a section 10(b) cause of action. The remaining elements of a
section 10(b) cause of action have been extensively covered else-
where140 and, therefore, a recitation of these elements would be of
marginal value.
Under the misappropriation theory, the acquisition of nonpublic in-
formation, and subsequent trading on such information, creates the
misrepresentation, omission, or fraudulent device. The inside infor-
mation must be material and acquired in violation of a fiduciary duty
owed, as an example, to an employer, a corporate client, or someone
similarly situated.141 Yet, the person to whom the duty is owed need
578 F. Supp. 425, 440-43 (D.N.Y. 1984), and United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024,
1026 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
137. See generally TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The Court in
TSC held that an omitted fact in a proxy statement is "material" if "there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." Id. at 449. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (Black-
mun, J., plurality), the Supreme Court adopted the TSC standard for materiality in
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions. Id. at 983 (Blackmun, J., plurality). In Basic, the
court analyzed materiality in the context of preliminary merger discussions. For lower
court cases that have applied the TSC materiality standard to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 actions, see Lockspeiser v. Western Maryland Co., 768 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir.
1985); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir.
1980); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977).
138. See infra notes 216-25 for the Act's impact on this element. In Basic, the
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, accepted the concept of a rebuttable presump-
tion of reliance that the open market price of a stock is established free of fraud. Ba-
sic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-92 (Blackmun, J., plurality).
139. See Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). In Elkind, the
Second Circuit permitted an action for damages equal to the difference between the
actual purchase (or sale) price and the price at which the individual would have
purchased (or sold), had the omitted information been disclosed. Thus, the maximum
damage award is the amount gained by the insider or tippee as a result of the trading.
See Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule 1Ob-5 Nondisclosure Claims: A Propo-
sal for Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 745, 762 (1982). Friedman asserts that Elkind's
measure of damages is incorrect because when a corporation is the defendant, all mar-
ket participants in the stock should be entitled to recover. Id.
140. See Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 1Ob-5 and
Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 264-71 (1981); Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I: Regula-
tion Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus.
LAW. 223, 230-46 (1985) [hereinafter Report of Task Force]; Conrad, Securities Regula-
tion in the Burger Court, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 193, 199-201 (1985); Note, Insider Trad-
ing and the Corporate Acquirer: Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5 Against Agents
Who Trade on Misappropriated Information, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 600, 621-31 (1988)
(corporate acquirer has a private cause of action against the employees of its invest-
ment banker).
141. See Report of Task Force, supra note 140, at 236 nn.40-41. The task force cites
a case regarding the duty between father and son: United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp.
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not be the purchaser nor seller of the securities. 142 The mere acquisi-
tion of the information is insufficient to maintain a cause of action.143
The defendant must also trade on the information or tip others about
the information in violation of Dirks.144
V. THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1988
The Act145 is a response by the House Committee to the insider
trading scandals that have occurred on Wall Street since 1986.146 The
Act's purposes are delineated in the accompanying Report of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce.147 By providing for
greater deterrence, detection, and punishment, the Act will enhance
the enforcement of the securities law.148 Finally, the Act attempts to
685 (D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd as to venue, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). The court upheld the
sufficiency of an indictment for insider trading on the theory that the son had misap-
propriated from his father confidential information concerning a forthcoming merger.
Additionally, according to members of the SEC and its staff, a duty could exist be-
tween a newspaper reporter and his or her readers. Report of Task Force, supra note
140, at 236 n.41. But see Note, supra note 81, at 1045-46 (journalists cannot be liable
under section 10(b) because reliance by a reader on reporters and newspapers does not
equate to a fiduciary relationship).
142. Id.; see Report of Task Force, supra note 140, at 236. But see Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). It is important to note, however, that the In-
sider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act expressly overturned cases such
as Moss, which prevented recovery by the plaintiff under the misappropriation theory.
See infra notes 211-215 and accompanying text.
143. Note, supra note 75, at 616.
144. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
145. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)).
146. REPORT, note 4, at 11-14. The Report noted the following: The "Yuppie Five,"
an insider trading group, traded in stocks and options of companies based upon infor-
mation Michael David misappropriated from his New York law firm. David Levine, a
managing director of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel), made $12.6 million by
trading on material nonpublic information regarding tender offers and mergers. The
Levine investigation uncovered Ivan Boesky, who made $50 million by trading on non-
public information provided by Levine. Martin Siegel, co-head of mergers and acquisi-
tions at Drexel, also had provided Boesky with confidential information about possible
takeover deals. Siegel's settlement with the government exceeded $9 million. William
Dillon, a stock broker, acquired advance copies of "Inside Wall Street," a column
found in Business Week, from a pressman employed by the printer of Business Week.
He subsequently traded in the stock, based upon the column, prior to the magazine's
publication. Similar to the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column, prices
of the stocks featured in the "Inside Wall Street" column were affected the same day
the column became public. Id.
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id; see Miller, Every Market Player Deserves To Be An Insider, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 29, 1988, at A22, col. 3 (to prevent insiders from trading, the law should demand
instant disclosure).
rebuild public confidence in the integrity of the securities market, es-
pecially in light of the stock market crash of October i987.149 The
House Committee emphasized that despite the self-policing measures
observed by various security organizations, "there is a clear need for
institutional, rather than individual, response to this problem."150
While the drafters of the Act realized the continuing concern re-
garding the development of an insider trading definition,'15 the Com-
mittee determined the Act should not provide a statutory definition
of insider trading for two reasons.'5 2 First, courts have established
clear guidelines which are applicable in all but a few cases of insider
trading. Consequently, any statutory definition "could potentially be
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate a scheme to evade
the law."'15 3 Second, establishing a definition of insider trading would
have delayed the enactment of the legislation due to the lack of con-
sensus concerning the appropriate parameters of the definition of in-
sider trading.54 Having established the underlying congressional
purpose and policy of the Act, the various sections of the Act must be
examined.
A. Civil Penalties
The Act provides for civil penalties against insider trading violators
149. REPORT, supra note 4, at 7; see also The October 1987 Market Break, SEC Staff
Report, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271, Special Report, xii, (Feb. 9, 1988) (an in-
crease in the market volatility can negatively affect investor's confidence in the stock
market and in the long run, impact the ability of corporations to efficiently raise capi-
tal); Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confi-
dence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1988). "Public confidence in the nation's securities
markets is the function of a number of interrelated variables. Although Congress and
the SEC have recently placed great weight on a vigorous insider trading enforcement
program, factors such as market stability are also important elements in the calculus
of investor confidence." Id. at 704 (citations omitted).
150. REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-15.
151. See Note, Logical Inconsistencies in the SEC's Enforcement of Insider Trading:
Guidelines for a Definition, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV 935 (1987). This note argues that
Congress's definition of insider trading should be based on Cady, Roberts and thus:
impose 10b-5 liability on outsiders who undermine the integrity of the securi-
ties markets by trading on illegally obtained information. Congressional reli-
ance on the Cady, Roberts analysis would bolster confidence in the
marketplace without impairing legitimate investment activities. Finally, an
insider trading definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady, Roberts would
offer outsiders guidance concerning the types of activities that constitute in-
sider trading and also would provide adequate deterrence against outsiders
who trade fraudulently on inside information.
Id. at 953-54 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trad-
ing, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377 (1989). "Under the efficiency analysis conducted in this note,
only insider activity that results in harm to society beyond direct wealth transfers
should be prohibited." Id. at 399.
152. REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-11.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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and those who control the violators.55 For a person who trades
"'while in possession of material nonpublic information' or 'by com-
municating such information in connection with a transaction,' "156
the maximum civil penalty would be treble the profit gained, or the
loss avoided, due to the unlawful trading.157 Controlling persons in-
clude broker-dealers, investment advisors, employers, and other indi-
viduals "with power to influence or control the direction of the
management, policies, or activities of another person."158 The deter-
mination of who is a controlling person is a question of fact and
therefore is made on a case-by-case basis.159 A controlling person is
liable when he or she knows, or recklessly disregards, facts that indi-
cate a controlled person was trading on inside information or was en-
gaging in a tipping violation.16 0 Before liability will exist, the
inadequacy of the controlling person's supervision and surveillance
must also relate to the controlled person's violation.161 If the control-
ling person is found liable, the minimum civil penalty is $1 million,
with a maximum ceiling of three times the profit earned, or loss
avoided, by the controlled person. 162 If the controlled person is a tip-
per,163 the profit or loss provision is determined by those individuals
with whom the tipper communicated and who subsequently traded
on the information. 164
The Act places two additional limitations on the liability of a con-
trolling person. The controlling person's liability may not be predi-
155. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677-80 (1988) (codified as U.S.C.
78(a)). Additionally, according to former SEC Enforcement Director Gary Lynch, the
SEC will ask Congress, pursuant to the Act, for power to impose civil penalties for all
federal securities laws violations. For example, this authority would permit the SEC
to impose a civil penalty any time it commences an injunctive action. Lynch Says SEC
Will Ask Congress for Civil Monetary Fine Authority, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 2, at 64-65 (Jan. 13, 1989).
156. REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 17.
159. Id.
160. Id. The actions by a control person must constitute "a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation." Id. at 18
(citation omitted).
161. Id. at 36.
162. Id.
163. A tipper is an insider, either corporate or noncorporate, who provides material
nonpublic information to outsiders. Note, The Misappropriation Theory: Rule 10b-5 In-
sider Liability for Nonfiduciary Breach, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049, 1062 (1987); see
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647-49 (1983).
164. REPORT, supra note 4, at 36. The Act does not alter the tipper/tippee liability
standard.
cated solely upon the principle of respondeat superior.165
Additionally, liability is determined by the specific standards con-
tained in the Act, rather than section 20(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which addresses the general responsibility of
controlling persons towards controlled persons.166
In addition to the requirements stated above, the Act also places
further responsibility on broker-dealers and investment advisors.
Broker-dealers and investment advisors must "establish, maintain
and enforce written [supervisory] policies and procedures 'reasonably
designed to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information' in
violation of the Exchange Act ...."167
B. Bounty Provision
The Securities and Exchange Commission, at its discretion and
without judicial review, has the authority to award a bounty payment
to those individuals who provide information concerning insider trad-
ing violations.168 The bounty provision provides an incentive for indi-
viduals to supply information concerning possible insider trading
violations that the Commission or the United States Attorney might
not otherwise receive. 16 9 The maximum possible bounty is ten per-
cent of either the penalty imposed or the settlement reached. 170 The
provision expressly excludes those individuals who have a responsi-
bility to enforce the securities laws.171
C. Criminal Penalties
During the House subcommittee hearings, witnesses advocated that
the strongest deterrent for white-collar criminals is a jail term.172
Consequently, the Act revises the criminal penalties contained in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 32, as follows: the maximum
jail sentence is increased from five years to ten years; the maximum
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 21. For example, the Committee stated that a firm's policies and proce-
dures should restrict the communication of confidential information and monitor its
dissemination by restricting access to files containing confidential information. Firms
should also initiate educational programs addressing insider trading and monitor their
employees' stock market trading activity. Id. at 22.
168. Id.; see also SEC Soon to Propose Rules Implementing Insider Trading Act's
Bounty Provision, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 515-16 (Apr. 7, 1989); In-
sider Trading Tipsters: SEC Lets Your Fingers Do the Finking, L.A. Times, June 29,
1989, Part IV, at 1, col. 1 (tipsters may call their local SEC office in order to turn in
inside traders and possibly collect "bounty" money).
169. See generally Roberts, Securities Lawyers Fear Abuse of New Insider-Trading
Bill, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 27, 1988 at 1, col. 2.
170. REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
171. Id. at 22-23.
172. Id. at 16, 23.
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criminal fine for individuals is increased from $100,000 to $1 million;
and the maximum criminal fines for non-natural persons is increased
from $500,000 to $2.5 million.173
D. Expressed Private Right of Action
The Act codifies an express right of action against insider traders
and tippers174 for the benefit of market participants who "contempo-
raneously" trade in the same security, but on the opposite side of the
market from the insider trader. 7 s Although the Report uses the
term "insider traders and tippers,"176 the actual language of the Act
does not limit the right of action to insiders only.177 Rather, "[a]ny
person who violates [the Exchange Act of 1934 or any rule thereun-
der] by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of mate-
rial, nonpublic information shall be liable in an action" brought by an
individual who traded contemporaneously in the security, but on the
opposite side.178 The Act does not define "contemporaneous" because
it relies on the developed case law definition.179 A tipper shall be
jointly and severally liable with, and to the same extent as, the per-
son to whom the tipper directly communicates.1 8 0 This direct com-
munication provision limits the tipper's liability. If the tipper was
held liable for all communication that resulted from his or her origi-
nal communication, it would expose the communicator to tremen-
dous liability which, in turn, could possibly chill legitimate business
communications.' 8 l
173. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (1988) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff).
174. For the definition of "tipper," see supra note 163.
175. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. To be on the opposite side of the market, one in-
dividual must purchases the stock while another contemporaneously sells it, or vice-
versa.
176. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 27 n.22. The cases cited within the Report are Wilson v. Comtech
Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs purchased stock
one month after defendant sold it; therefore, plaintiffs did not contemporaneously
trade with the insiders); Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (duty owed to all persons "who during the same period
[trade in the security] without knowledge of the material inside information" which
defendant possessed); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
800, 805 n.5 (D.N.Y. 1983) (defendant's trading occurred only over a seven day period;
therefore, the "trades clearly were sufficiently contemporaneous" to establish a con-
clusion of liability under Wilson).
180. REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
181. Id at 39.
Significantly, the Act's codification and acceptance of the misappro-
priation theory18 2 is demonstrated by the express right of action
which "is specifically intended to overturn court cases which have
precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is
premised upon the misappropriation theory."18 3 The Committee fur-
ther expressed that "the misappropriation theory fulfills appropriate
regulatory objectives in determining when communicating or trading
while in possession of material nonpublic information is unlawful."184
E. SEC Authority to Cooperate with Foreign Governments
The SEC has attempted to cultivate cooperation with foreign gov-
ernments because insider trading violations occurring outside the
United States 8 5 have increased through such practices as offshore
banking.186 Consequently, the Act increases the SEC's authority to
investigate and assist foreign authorities in establishing whether a vi-
olation has occurred under the foreign laws.'8 7 While the Commis-
sion has discretion to assist foreign governments, it should also
consider: (1) whether the foreign government has a reciprocal agree-
ment to assist the Commission when the Commission investigates
United States security matters; and (2) whether the assistance would
be contrary to the public interest of the United States. 8 8 The full
range of SEC procedures and remedies are available in the
investigation.189
182. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (1988) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78t-1). The House report states, "the misappropriation theory clearly remains
valid in the Second Circuit, [which was] the lower [c]ourt in the Winans case, but is
unresolved nationally. In the view of the Committee, however, this type of security
fraud should be encompassed within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." REPORT, supra
note 4, at 10.
183. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26 (citing Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984)); see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying
text.
184. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26-27. For a broader discussion of the adoption of the
misappropriation theory and its implications, see infra notes 190-225 and accompany-
ing text.
185. REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.
186. For example, Dennis Levine, a managing director of Drexel, used a Bahamian
broker and bank to effectuate his trading on inside information. Eventually the Baha-
mian broker correlated Levine's success with the takeover targets that Levine had
traded in. As a result, the broker began to personally copy Levine's trades, without
Levine's knowledge. Id. at 12.
187. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6, 102 Stat. 4677, 4681-82 (1988) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(c), (u)); REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.
188. REPORT, supra note 4, at 39.
189. Id.; see SEC, DOJ Set Up Framework to Review Foreign Requests For Investiga-
tive Help, 4. Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA) No. 9, at 2-3 (Mar. 1, 1989). See generally
Note, International Cooperation in Insider Trading Cases, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1149 (1983) (international participation and resulting conflicts in security trading
investigations).
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VI. CRITIQUE
A. The Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory represents a valid approach to estab-
lish liability in today's complex securities markets. As previously
stated, fraud is established by an individual's "deceitful exploitation
of information rightfully belonging to a third person."190 When one
trades on information entrusted to him or her, and damage to other
investors results, a rule 10b-5 cause of action may exist.191 However,
the failure to disclose the information or to trade on material non-
public information alone does not create sufficient fraud for a rule
10b-5 violation.192 Rather, the fraud exists because of the recipient's
use of an "informational advantage" acquired through deceit or
through an abuse of a confidential or trust relationship.193
The misappropriation theory has a broad and generalized scope. It
arises from the misappropriator's duty to the information creator,
and not from any fictional relationship between a misappropriator
and an individual on the opposing side of a transaction.194 The the-
ory creates no distinction between corporate insiders or outsiders,
nor between insiders who buy or sell the securities. However, the
theory is relevant to tipper and tippee liability.195 Finally, the theory
is applicable to "trading in options, or in debt securities, as well as
those who trade in stock."196
The misappropriation theory is also consistent with the general
concept that trading on confidential information is unfair.197 If a
trader creates information through diligence, foresight, and superior
analytical ability, most people would not find trading on such infor-
mation morally wrong, as the information results from an individ-
ual's own efforts.198 Conversely, acquiring information in breach of a
duty owed to another seems improper because an obligation of confi-
dence should not be broken for personal benefit. 199
190. Aldave, supra note 5, at 121.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
195. Aldave, supra note 5, at 121.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 122.
198. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-40 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
199. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Mar-
kets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 S. CAL. L.
However, the misappropriation theory does not prohibit all trading
on nonpublic information; it only prevents trading on information ac-
quired in breach of a fiduciary duty.20 0 Thus, the misappropriation
theory does not bar those who create or possess information with the
consent of the information source from trading on the information.20 1
Contrary to Chief Justice Burger's position in Chiarella,20 2 the
misappropriation theory does not reach those who steal or misappro-
priate the information from a stranger.203 Further, the misappropria-
tion theory does not prohibit subsequent trading on information
inadvertently discovered, for example, by overhearing a conversa-
tion.2 04 Simply stated, the misappropriation theory only prevents
trading based upon information acquired from the rightful owner
through a breach of a fiduciary duty.20 5
B. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988
Due to the recent passage of the Act, no authorities exist address-
ing the Act's eventual impact. The following analysis is based upon a
logical reading of the Act in conjunction with past insider trading
cases.
The Act should affect two elements of the section 10(b) cause of
action,206 namely the "in connection with" requirement and the reli-
ance element. Generally stated, the "in connection with" element re-
quires that the alleged misrepresentation be in connection with the
purchase or sale of the security.20 7 The reliance element requires
that the plaintiff's decision to trade in the security be causally con-
nected to the defendant's conduct.2 08
The Act should liberalize the "in connection with" requirement.
The Second Circuit has approached the "in connection with" test dif-
ferently, depending upon whether a criminal or private cause of ac-
REV. 1217, 1248 (1981). "[T]he average American ... probably has a visceral reaction
that inside trading definitely harms someone else in the market and may harm the is-
suer. This reaction is absolutely correct. In short, any public antipathy toward inside
trading has a valid foundation." Id
200. Aldave, supra note 5, at 121.
201. Id. at 121-22; see supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
202. Chief Justice Burger expressed that the misappropriation theory would pro-
hibit thieves from profiting by trading on stolen information. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
241-42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
203. Aldave, supra note 5, at 122. For these individuals, a common law theft or
fraud cause of action may be utilized to establish liability.
204. See supra note 48. See generally SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla.
1984).
205. Aldave, supra note 5, at 122.
206. See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text for the elements of a section
10(b) cause of action.
207. See generally Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman), at 3-4 (Jan. 1985).
208. Report of Task Force, supra note 140, at 243.
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tion is involved. In Carpenter, Materia, and Newman, all criminal
actions, the Second Circuit determined that the defendants had vio-
lated section 10(b) when the purpose for misappropriating the infor-
mation was only to purchase securities. 20 9 Thus, the "in connection
with" test was therefore satisfied, even though the defendants did
not violate a duty to the purchasers or sellers of the securities. 210
However, in Moss, the court limited the private cause of action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to only those plaintiffs to whom the de-
fendant owed a duty.2 11
However, as noted above, the Act has expressly overturned cases
such as Moss which prohibit a plaintiff from maintaining a private
cause of action because the defendant owed no duty to the plain-
tiff.212 Given the House Report's vast and expansive reading of the
misappropriation theory for a private cause of action and the unac-
ceptability of the Moss result,213 it is reasonable to postulate that the
"in connection with" test for a private cause of action will be the
same as that applied in criminal actions.214
Presumably, a duty between the plaintiff and the defendant will no
longer be required. Rather, the fraud will be "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of securities whenever the information would be
considered of "no value whatsoever except 'in connection with' [the]
subsequent purchase of securities." 215
The Act should also reduce the plaintiff's burden of proving reli-
ance in a private cause of action. The plaintiff must act with justifi-
209. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
210. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033.
211. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983); see Materia, 745
F.2d at 203.
212. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
213. "The Committee believes that [the result in Moss] is inconsistent with the re-
medial purposes of the Exchange Act, and that the misappropriation theory fulfills ap-
propriate regulatory objectives in determining when communication or trading while
in possession of material nonpublic information is unlawful." REPORT, supra note 4, at
26-27.
214. If it were otherwise, a benefit conferred to the private plaintiff by the adoption
of the misappropriation theory would be taken away by requiring, as the court did in
Moss, an existing duty between the plaintiff and the defendant. If the Moss duty re-
quirement still exists after the Act's enactment, then the express private right of ac-
tion would not benefit private individuals, rendering that section of the Act
superfluous. If this were the case, the express private right of action would never have
been codified in the Act.
215. Materia, 745 F.2d at 203; see United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
able reliance on the defendant's fraudulent actions,216 which only
requires a connection between the defendant's actions and the plain-
tiff's decision to purchase or sell securities. One view, followed only
in the Sixth Circuit,217 precludes private plaintiffs from recovering
when "defendant's act of trading with third persons was not causally
connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs who traded on the im-
personal market and who were otherwise unaffected by the wrongful
acts of the insider."218 The other view established by the Second Cir-
cuit, in Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,219
created a two-part analysis for determining reliance. First, reliance is
established by alleging that the plaintiff would have altered his stock
purchase or sale if the information held by the defendant had been
known to the plaintiff.220 Second, a presumption of reliance exists
once the plaintiff has established a duty to disclose and the material-
ity of the information involved. 221 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,222 the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion followed the Second Circuit by ac-
cepting a rebuttable presumption of reliance that the market price of
a security was established free of fraud.223
Arguably, the Act accepts the Second Circuit's presumption of reli-
ance since an individual must only establish a contemporaneous trade
on the opposite side of the market from the defendant-insider
trader.224 By requiring only contemporaneous trading, the Act does
not appear to require the plaintiff's direct reliance on the defendant's
activities. Thus, given the expansive language of the Report accom-
panying the Act,225 the Act arguably endorses the Second Circuit's
216. See Report of Task Force, supra note 140, at 243-44.
217. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977). The plaintiffs brought an action under rule 10b-5 alleging that the defendants
traded while possessing material inside information concerning a possible acquisition
of the company with which defendants were closely associated. The plaintiffs asserted
they would not have sold their stock had they been aware of the possible merger
agreement. Id. at 311.
218. Id. at 318-19.
219. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Defendant, potential underwriter for Douglas de-
bentures, received information from Douglas management concerning unfavorable
earnings. The defendant then disclosed this information to a few of the defendant's
clients before it was publically announced. Due to such a large selling volume, the
stock dropped dramatically. During this period and prior to the public disclosure of
the earnings information, the plaintiffs had bought stock and sustained a substantial
loss because of the vast selling of those informed by the defendant of the unfavorable
earnings of Douglas. Id.
220. Id. at 239-40.
221. Id. at 240.
222. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (Blackmun, J., plurality).
223. Id. at 990 (Blackmun, J., plurality) (stating that "[r]equiring a plaintiff to show
a speculative state of facts . . . would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary
burden on the rule 10b-5 plaintiff").
224. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
225. REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (need to curtail insider trading to restore public
trust in the integrity of the stock market), 10 (acceptance of the misappropriation the-
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presumption of reliance for a rule 10b-5 action.
VII. CONCLUSION
What the Court left unresolved in Carpenter, Congress has seen fit
to settle. The misappropriation theory has been codified into an ex-
press private right of action. In light of the expanding securities mar-
ket, the theory correctly premises liability on an individual's
deceptive use of information, rather than upon a fiduciary relation-
ship between market participants. The misappropriation of material
nonpublic information harms the rightful controller of the informa-
tion, as well as those who trade with the misappropriator, and prop-
erly constitutes a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
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ory as within section 10(b) and rule 10b-5), 26-28 (discussion of the express private
right of action).

